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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
District Court No. 071902062 
CHRISTINA LYNN BRIGGS, : Appellate Court No. 20080567 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt by a jury for Aggravated 
Robbery, a first-degree felony, and Aggravated Kidnapping, a first-degree 
felony. The Defendant was found guilty on March 21, 2008. She was 
sentenced on May 27, 2008, to a term of five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison on the aggravated robbery charge and fifteen (15) years to life in the 
Utah State Prison on the aggravated kidnapping charge, to run concurrent with 
one another. The Defendant is currently serving her sentence in the Utah State 
Prison. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §§78A-3-102(4) and 
78A-4-103. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied her right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which 
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT H 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS 
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INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law 
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we 
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
conviction." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). Since 
Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed verdict, it should be reviewed 
under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant . . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH STATUTES 
U.C.A §76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
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presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A. §76-6-302. Aggravated Robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
U.C.A. §76-5-301. Kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to 
risk of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent or 
legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 
14 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
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(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
U.C.A §76-5-302. Aggravated Kidnapping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or a as shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to 
forbear from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; or 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Part 4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 
15 years and which may be for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if 
the trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the 
aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; 
or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the 
commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously 
convicted of a grievous sexual offense. 
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(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds 
that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the 
best interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the 
court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for 
life; or 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b): 
(i) ten years and which may be for life; or 
(ii) six years and which may be for life. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced 
under Subsection (3)(c). 
§78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
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Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
and the state engineer; 
(b) Appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital felony. 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except 
in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, 
child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of 
Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, 
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
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Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or 
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
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to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right 
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or 
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an 
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and 
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
9 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 17(P) 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing 
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense 
charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with two separate offenses. 
A jury found her guilty of counts one and two, aggravated robbery in violation 
of U.C.A. §76-6-302 and aggravated kidnapping in violation of §76-5-302. (R. 
135/P. 208). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 8, 2007, the Defendant, Christina Lynn Briggs, 
accompanied Brandon Morris to the Timbermine restaurant where she was 
scheduled to meet up with John Barlow. (R.134/P. 146-47, 171, 209). When 
they met John Barlow, Defendant said that "her cousin" needed a ride up the 
canyon. (R. 134/P. 147, 172). Mr. Barlow suggested taking his work van 
rather than Defendant's car. (R.134/P. 147, 174). When Mr. Barlow started 
10 
climbing into his van, Mr. Morris grabbed his left shoulder, and Mr. Barlow 
felt a sharp object in his back. (R. 134/P. 147, 174). Mr. Morris made Mr. 
Barlow sit in a steel chair between the two bucket seats, climbed into the 
driver's seat and leaned over Mr. Barlow to unlock the passenger door for 
Defendant. (R. 134/P. 147-48, 175-76, 205-06). Mr. Morris took Mr. 
Barlow's keys and wallet, and Defendant took his cell phone. (R. 134/P. 148, 
176). 
Mr. Morris drove the van up Ogden Canyon and around the dam while 
holding the knife to Mr. Barlow's left side. (R. 134/P. 148, 178, 210). 
Defendant bound Mr. Barlow's hands with a hoodie string. (R. 134/P. 185). 
When they reach 9500 East and SR-39, Defendant threw Mr. Barlow's cell 
phone out the window. (R. 134/P. 149, 181,210). Mr. Morris continued driving 
past the Red Rock Cafe until he turned up a dirt road at approximately mile 
marker 33.2 on SR-39. (R.134/P. 149, 183). Mr. Morris and Defendant drove 
up that road about 100 yards, parked, and told Mr. Barlow to get out of the car, 
then made him walk out into the woods about 20 yards. (R. 134/P. 149, 183, 
211). Mr. Morris and Defendant then tied Mr. Barlow to a tree using a hoodie 
string and soldering wire. (R.134/P. 149-50, 185, 211). Mr. Morris and 
Defendant then left Mr. Barlow tied to a tree. (R. 134/P. 187). 
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Defendant and Mr. Morris got back in the van and left. (R. 134/P. 187-
88). Mr. Morris drove off fast and hit a big boulder that was partially buried in 
the path. The boulder was ripped from the ground by the force and dragged 
about 40 feet. (R. 134/P. 213). The undercarriage of the van was severely 
damaged by the collision with the rock. (R. 134/P. 150, 189, 191). Mr. Morris 
and Defendant then turned back onto the main road but only made it about 200 
yards before the driveline snapped and the van broke down. (R. 134/P. 150, 
189, 191). The van left a trail of transmission fluid beginning at the dislodged 
boulder continuing to where the van became disabled on the road. (R. 134/P. 
213). Mr. Barlow got himself untied and ran out to the road just in time to see 
Mr. Morris and Defendant get into a white truck. (R. 134/P. 151, 188-190). 
Defendant and Mr. Morris went to the Red Rock Cafe where they were 
picked up by Steve Stefaniak and Jeanine Walton. (R. 134/P. 152-53; R. 
135/P. 21). They then accompanied Steve and Jeanine to a campsite where 
they partied and drank. (R. 135/P. 23; R. 135/P. 33-34, 49). They planned to 
stay overnight at the campsite with Steven and Jeanine until Mr. Morris 
realized he needed his insulin. (R. 134/P. 153; R. 135/P. 42-43). Jeanine drove 
them to the Timbermine in an orange pickup where she intended to drop them 
off at Defendant's car until Defendant spotted an undercover cop and told 
Jeanine not to stop. (R- 134/P. 153; JL 135/P. 25). Jeanine dropped them off 
12 
somewhere on Monroe, then went back up to the campsite and made 
arrangements to meet them the next day. (R. 134/P. 153-54; P. 135/P. 26-27). 
After Mr. Barlow became unbound, he ran to the disabled van. (R. 
134/P. 190). Mr. Barlow managed to flag someone down and had them contact 
the Weber County Sheriff. (R. 134/P. 191-92). When the police arrived, they 
investigated the scene and found an empty spool of solder near the van. (R. 
134/P. 192; R. 135/P. 13). They recovered the discarded cell phone (R. 134/P. 
193), observed approximately 20 large scratch and puncture marks on Mr. 
Barlow's left side, (R. 134/P. 212) and red lines around his wrists where it 
appeared he had been bound. (R. 134/P. 213). The police found several items 
near the campfire area where the van was parked while Mr. Barlow was being 
tied to the tree as well as the string that was still tied to the tree to which Mr. 
Barlow had been bound. (R. 134/P. 229; R. 135/P. 53). They did not locate 
the soldering wire that had bound him to the tree. (R. 135/P. 13). 
Mr. Barlow informed officers about the car in the Timbermine parking 
lot. The police verified that the vehicle was registered to Defendant, and they 
watched the car and waited for her to return for it. (R. 134/P. 215). When 
Defendant failed to return for her car, the detectives executed a search warrant 
on the vehicle and found the names of the Defendant and Mr. Morris in the 
vehicle. (R. 134/P. 117). They also obtained the license plate number of the 
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orange truck when they observed it driving through the parking lot. (R. 134/P. 
154). The police then discovered Defendant and Mr. Morris were staying at 
Mr. Morris's father's house and went and arrested them. (R. 134/155) 
After taking the Defendant and Mr. Morris to the sheriffs office, they 
interviewed Defendant. Her testimony was that she and Mr. Barlow had 
consensually decided to hang out and Mr. Barlow sexually assaulted her, then 
Defendant called for help. (R. 134/159-60). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant raises two points on appeal. First, her trial counsel was 
ineffective when he failed to move the trial court for a directed verdict at the 
conclusion of the State's case. Second, the trial court committed plain error 
when it did not dismiss the case due to insufficiency of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, 
the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687,80L.Ed.2dat693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 
688. Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the 
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance," Id. at 688, it did mention certain minimal requirements. These 
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well 
as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the 
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the 
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688. 
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Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court 
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct 
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to 
be deficient. The Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, 
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence 
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Kimmelman v. 
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to 
comport with constitutional requirements, the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct 
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only 
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while 
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for 
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under 
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance 
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional 
assistance in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All 
U.S. 365, 386 (1986). 
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The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In State v. Finlayson 2000 UT 10, f24, 994 P.2d 1243, the Supreme 
Court of Utah affirmed this Courts reversal of the defendant's conviction 
where the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was key to the reversal.(See 
State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). In that case, the Court 
held: 
That the facts in this case do not support a conviction for 
aggravated kidnaping is clear from Couch and Jolivet. Yet 
defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge, and failed 
to raise this at any time, either during trial, or following the 
conviction in a motion to vacate. As this is an issue that would 
have been raised outside the presence of the jury, no possible 
prejudice would have inured to defendant. When no possible 
explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision, we have 
held that the first part of the Strickland test, is satisfied. {State v. 
Finlayson 2000 UT 10, % 24, 994 P.2d 1243 citations omitted, 
emphasis added.) 
In the present case, defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict 
after the State rested. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make 
a motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure, 
and this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the definition of Strickland and its Federal and State progeny. The general 
practice of defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a directed verdict or 
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motion to dismiss after the state has rested. This is especially true when the 
state has failed to strongly establish one or more of the elements of the charge. 
In the present case like in Finlayson, there is simply no reason for trial 
counsel not to move the court for a directed verdict when the evidence against 
the Defendant was that Mr. Barlow claimed she assisted Mr. Morris in the 
actions, when defense counsel knew that Defendant was a former paramour of 
Mr. Barlow and that he was likely developing a story and changing facts to 
explain away damage to his truck, and to get back at Defendant for not 
agreeing to be intimate with him. This failure clearly fiilfills the first prong of 
the Strickland test. 
The second prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Again, in the case of State 
v. Finlayson 2000 UT 10, f 26, 994 P.2d this Court ruled that, "Accordingly, 
we hold that defendant's counsel's failure to object to the aggravated 
kidnapping charge rendered his performance constitutionally deficient and 
prejudiced defendant". 
In the case at bar, police ofiQcers were called to SR-39 because Mr. 
Barlow claimed he had been assaulted by a knife. (R. 134/P. 207). The police 
first responded to the Red Rock Cafe where the call had come from Dave 
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Moss. Mr. Moss directed the officer to approximately mile marker 33.2 on SR-
39. (R. 134/P. 207). When the police arrived, Mr. Barlow was sitting in his 
disabled Chevy work van. Deputy Oge spoke with Mr. Barlow who was pale 
and visibly shaking. (R. 134/P. 208). Mr. Barlow claimed he had been 
kidnapped by somebody with a knife after arranging by text message to meet 
up with Defendant for dinner at the Timbermine restaurant. (R. 134/P. 208-
09). Mr. Barlow told Deputy Oge that an unknown white male was with 
Defendant and that he was forced into his van at knifepoint and driven up 
Ogden Canyon. Defendant took Mr. Barlow's cell phone and threw it out the 
window after going through it. (R. 134/P. 210). When they reached 
approximately mile-marker 33.2, they turned the van up a dirt road where they 
parked the van. Mr. Barlow claimed the unknown white male made him get 
out of the van, took his wallet, and made Mr. Barlow walk to the woods where 
he tied Mr. Barlow to a tree using a hoodie string and solder wire from the 
work van. (R. 134/P. 211). Deputy Oge observed a trail of transmission fluid 
from the disabled van up to where Mr. Barlow said they had pulled off the road 
and up into the dirt area. He also observed a string attached to a tree, evidence 
on the ground around where the van was parked, multiple scratch marks, a 
couple of puncture marks on Mr. Barlow's left side, and red lines around Mr. 
Barlow's wrists. (R. 134/P. 212-13). 
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After a short period, more detectives arrived to investigate the crime 
scenes. The officers recovered Mr. Barlow's cell phone from where Defendant 
had thrown it out the van window, an empty roll of solder outside the van 
where it was disabled, and multiple items from the campsite near where Mr. 
Barlow had been tied. The detectives did not recover any soldering wire from 
where Mr. Barlow has been tied (R. 135/P. 13), they did not recover a knife (R. 
135/P. 104), and no fingerprints were found on any of the recovered evidence 
(R. 135/ P. 93) or in the van (R. 135/ 95-96). The officers did not find any 
footprints leaving the van other than Mr. Barlow's. (R. 135/P. 13). 
There are even discrepancies in Mr. Barlow's story. During his 
testimony, he stated that Mr. Morris asked him for his keys, wallet and phone 
after climbing into the van at the Timbermine. (R. 134/P. 176). However, 
Deputy Oge's testimony was that Mr. Barlow told him that he was forced to 
give up his wallet after they parked up on the dirt road and Mr. Morris forced 
him out of the van. (R. 134/P. 211). Mr. Barlow describes how his hands were 
tied during his testimony (R. 134/P 186, 200), yet there is a question of how his 
hands were tied and how he described it to the officers (R. 135/P. 12, 18-19). 
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 lists the elements of aggravated 
robbery. A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, she: 
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(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 lists the elements of robbery. A person 
commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to 
take personal property in the possession of another from 
his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to 
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the 
personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
In the case at hand, the State did not prove all the elements of the 
offenses charged. The State did not prove that the Defendant took or attempted 
to take Mr. Barlow's personal property at all, much less against his will, by 
means of force or fear. The wallet that was taken from Mr. Barlow was not 
found in the Defendant's possession. Additionally, the State failed to prove 
that there was a dangerous weapon involved. The investigators did not recover 
a knife nor did they offer evidence that the scratches on Mr. Barlow's left side 
were caused by a knife. The scratches suffered by Mr. Barlow did not 
constitute serious bodily injury. Finally, the State failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant took or attempted to take an operable vehicle. 
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Mr. Barlow testified that he volunteered his vehicle for the drive up the 
canyon. (R. 134/P. 174). 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-302 lists the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping. A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the 
course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or a as 
shield or hostage, or to compel a third person to 
engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, 
or flight after commission or attempted commission 
of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a 
felony; or 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any 
governmental or political function; or 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-301 lists the elements of kidnapping. An actor 
commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of 
time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing 
the victim to risk of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the 
minor's parent or legal guardian or the consent of a person 
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acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 14 years of age or 
older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state 
line. 
The State failed to prove the elements of the crime charged. The State did not 
show that Defendant detained or restrained the victim for any substantial 
period of time or in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily injury. 
The police found a hoodie string tied to a tree, but they did not recover the 
soldering wire that Mr. Barlow claims was used to tie him to that tree. In 
addition, no one saw Mr. Barlow tied to that tree. The State did not show that 
Defendant moved Mr. Barlow any substantial distance. Mr. Barlow 
volunteered the use of his vehicle for the drive up the canyon and voluntarily 
entered the vehicle for the drive. Defendant did not hold Mr. Barlow for 
ransom. Nor did the State prove that Defendant acted with the intent to 
facilitate the commission or flight after commission of a felony or to hinder or 
delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony as the State failed to prove that 
any felony was committed. Finally, the State failed to prove that Defendant 
possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon. 
Based on the insufficient evidence outlined above, Defendant's counsel 
should have moved the court to dismiss the case. Under Rule 17(p) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court "may issue an order dismissing any 
information ... upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
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establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense." Defense 
counsel did not raise that possibility for the trial court to decide. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF 
ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION, 
In State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^11, 10 P.3d 346, the Utah Supreme 
Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not 
be raised on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial 
counsel's performance falls below a reasonable standard. This Court further 
stated "[i]t necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the 
case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency 
of the evidence is apparent to the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
Defendant recognizes the difficult burden she must overcome in 
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The Court's 
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence 
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App. 155, ]f22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58, 
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If67, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[ojrdinarily, a reviewing court 
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts 
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict.'5 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an appellate court 
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction 
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid 
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
defendant's guilty verdict Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second-
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case, 
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole 
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the 
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to 
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he 
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hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the 
Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that 
the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost 
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^[18, 
63 P.3d 94, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined 
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in the murder of an individual. 
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was 
found; but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had 
the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendant's] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the 
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed 
it ever existed. Id. at f 18. 
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While Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict, Defendant submits that even with an extensive 
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is undisputed 
that there is no physical evidence connecting the Defendant to the crimes 
charged. There was no knife or soldering wire recovered, and what little 
evidence was recovered had no connection to Defendant, and no fingerprints 
were found. The only evidence connecting Defendant to the crime was the 
testimony of Mr. Barlow, a former and possibly jealous paramour of 
Defendant. Mr. Barlow's testimony was inconsistent on some very important 
elements of the crimes he alleges were committed against him. He claimed 
that Defendant took his cell phone, yet he changes his story of when it was 
taken from him. Mr. Barlow's story of how he was tied to the tree was 
inconsistent. In his testimony, he claimed his hands were bound in one way, 
but when he spoke to police, he indicated his hands had been bound differently. 
All of this notwithstanding, the State failed to prove all of the elements 
of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, which were out lined under 
Point I. For this reason, the trial court should have dismissed the case when 
Defendant's trial counsel failed to make a motion to dismiss. The evidence 
was insufficient to convict Defendant of the crimes she was charged with. 
Furthermore, all three elements of a plain error claim are present. The error 
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exists. The error being that the State failed to prove all of the elements of the 
offenses. Number two, this error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
The final element is that the error was harmful. Based on the insufficiency of 
the evidence Defendant should not have been convicted. Therefore, she was 
prejudiced by the Court's failure to dismiss the case, and her convictions 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State failed to prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds should have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crimes she was convicted of. 
For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse her 
convictions. 
DATED this j£_ day of Janua;y20k). 
)ALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Date: May 27, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marykd 
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY 
Prosecutor: NATHAN D LYON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STUWERT B JOHNSON 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 10, 1973 
Video 
CHARGES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
CD24328100 pages: 
071902062 BRIGGS,CHRISTINA LYNN 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/21/08 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/21/08 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
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defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison sentence imposed on each count in this case may run 
concurrently to each other. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit time served. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
CHRISTINA MEEHAN 
CHRISTINA GARDNER 
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $1,250 to John 
Barlow and $3,500 to Utah Mechanical Contractors. Restitution 
shall be paid as a condition of parole and is to be paid joint and 
serverally with the co-defendant, Brandon Lee Morris. 
Dated this ^ y day of y^€^Uf 20 P^. 
^£> ££. 
SCOTT M HADLEY 
District Court Judge 
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